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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Defendant/appellee Brigham City submits that the issues 
presented for review are as follows: 
1. Whether the trial court correctly determined that the 
Brigham City Council's exercise of legislative discretion in 
setting electrical utility rates which generate revenues in 
excess of the cost of providing electrical utility services is 
valid and not so unreasonable as to be arbitrary or capricious or 
in violation of the legislative guidelines in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 55-3-10. 
2. Whether the trial court correctly ruled, based upon the 
undisputed facts, that Brigham City's utility service charges, in 
the form of rates for electrical power, are reasonable for the 
service provided as a matter of law. 
3. Whether the trial court correctly concluded that a 
challenge to the validity of Brigham City's electrical utility 
rates by an individual resident who is a utility customer does 
not give rise to a claim of constitutional dimensions or 
otherwise establish the deprivation of a protected property 
interest in contravention of Art. I, § 22 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
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STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, this court 
views the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party and gives no deference to the trial court/s 
conclusions of law, reviewing them for correctness. Little 
America Hotel v. Salt lake City, 785 P.2d 1106, 1107 (Utah 1989); 
Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc. v. The Great N. Baseball Co., 786 
P.2d 763, 767 (Utah 1987). This standard should be applied in 
reviewing all the above issues. 
To the extent plaintiff/appellant Walker ("Walker") is 
arguing that his Motion For Summary Judgment was improperly 
denied, defendant/appellee Brigham City disagrees with his 
assertion that the facts relating to that motion must be 
"considered in a light most favorable to [Walker]." See 
Appellant's Brief, p. 1. Walker cannot have it both ways. He is 
the non-moving party only with respect to Brigham City's Motions 
For Partial Summary Judgment. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-10: 
Rates for service to be reasonable and uniform — May be 
revised. 
Rates for services furnished by any project or 
service as described in Section 55-3-1 hereof shall be 
reasonable and uniform in respect to class at all 
times. They may be fixed precedent to the issuance of 
the bonds. Such rates shall be sufficient to provide 
for the payment of the interest upon and principal of 
all such bonds as and when the same become due and 
payable, to create a bond and interest sinking fund 
therefor, to provide for the payment of the expenses of 
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administration and operation and such expenses for the 
maintenance of the project or service, necessary to 
preserve the same in good repair and working order, to 
build up a reserve for depreciation, to build up a 
reserve for improvements, betterments and extensions 
other than those necessary to maintain the same in good 
repair and working order, and to pay the interest on 
and principal of any other bonds or obligations 
outstanding and issued in connection with the purchase, 
construction, repair or improvement of the project or 
service. Such rates may be fixed and revised from time 
to time so as to produce these amounts, and the 
governing body may covenant and agree in the ordinance 
or other legislative enactment authorizing the issuance 
of such bonds and on the fact of each bond at all times 
to maintain such rates for services furnished by the 
project or service as shall be sufficient to provide 
for the foregoing, but not in excess of a reasonable 
rate for the service rendered. 
Utah Constitution Art. I, Section 22.: 
[Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Brigham City owns and operates various utilities providing 
services including water, waste treatment, refuse collection and 
electrical power to Brigham City residents and businesses. The 
City maintains a single utility fund combining these various 
services, but every individual consumer receives a bill itemizing 
the charges for each separate service, including electrical 
power, and the City separately accounts for the revenue derived 
from the different service charges. 
Electrical utility service charges have historically 
generated revenues which exceed the expenditures necessary for 
the operation of the utility service. A portion of these 
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revenues has been transferred to the City's general fund 
following the publication of notice concerning the anticipated 
transfer in the utility billings sent to customers in compliance 
with state statutory requirements. 
Plaintiff/appellant Leo Walker (hereinafter "Walker"), sued 
Brigham City asserting various claims relating to the process for 
setting the rates charged for electrical services, the City 
Council's management of utility funds and the general fund as 
well as various complaints about the City's financial 
relationship with its Redevelopment Agency. See Complaint, Record 
at 1 - 52. Claims 1 through 6 of plaintiff's Complaint were 
dismissed, pursuant to a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, by 
Order dated May 31, 1989. See Order, Record at 582-84. (A copy 
is included in the Addendum hereto.) Claims 13, 14 and 15 had 
been previously dismissed by an Order dated November 4, 1987. See 
Record at 196-97. 
On August 23, 1989, the Court granted a stipulated motion to 
bifurcate the Complaint. See Record at 600-01. Accordingly, 
claims 7 through 12 were bifurcated from the remaining claims, 
which involved the Brigham City Redevelopment Agency and various 
financial transactions in which it was engaged. It was agreed 
that the parties would proceed on Claims 7 through 12 and 
litigation on the remaining claims would be stayed.1 
1
 That determination was made prior to the decision and 
discussion of this court regarding Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure in Kennecott Corp. v Utah State Tax 
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Claims 7 through 12 challenged the validity of Brigham 
City's procedure for setting charges for electrical power and its 
practice of transferring funds from the electrical fund to the 
general fund. The basis of Walker's challenge was that the 
revenues received by Brigham City for electrical utility services 
are greater than the costs of providing such service and are 
therefore "unreasonable.11 
Brigham City moved for summary judgment on the grounds that, 
as a matter of law: 1) the electrical service charges are 
reasonable for the service provided when compared with the rates 
charged to similarly situated customers of Utah Power & Light and 
other municipally-owned power systems in the State of Utah; 
2) the process involved in setting rates and transferring funds 
from the utility fund to the general fund is pursuant to notice 
and discussion by the City Council in open and public meetings 
and is therefore fair and reasonable; and, 3) Walker's misplaced 
reliance on a rate of return analysis is not the proper measure 
of the reasonableness of electrical service charges and 
improperly requires the court to engage in rate setting which 
ignores the presumptive validity afforded such local governmental 
Commission. 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991). However, Walker's claims 
against the Redevelopment Agency of Brigham City and related 
parties are entirely separate and distinct and there is no 
"factual overlap" between the operative facts relating to those 
legal theories and the claims which are the subject of this 
appeal. See Complaint, Record at 1-52. In addition, a decision 
on the claims which are stayed and remain pending at the trial 
court level would not render moot or otherwise effect the issues 
in this appeal. 
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decisions and the limited scope of judicial review of such 
decisions. On March 27, 1991, the trial court entered its 
Memorandum Decision granting Brigham City's Motion For Summary 
Judgment. Record at (this document is not stamped, but it is 
between pp. 743 and 744 of the Record and included in the 
Addendum hereto). The Court's Order And Judgment was entered on 
April 22, 1991. Record at (this document is not stamped, but it 
is between pp. 752 and 753 of the Record and attached in the 
Addendum hereto).2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Brigham City disputes the accuracy and materiality of many 
of the facts set forth in the "FACTS" statement of Walker's Brief 
on appeal.3 Walker, furthermore, now attempts to present to this 
2
 The trial court's Order and Judgment of April 22, 1991, 
made an express determination that it was a final judgment for 
purposes of appeal as required by Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. See the discussion in Footnote 1 confirming 
that there is no factual overlap between the operative facts 
relating to the plaintiff's claims that are the subject of this 
appeal and the claims which were stayed and remain pending at the 
trial court level relating to the Brigham City Redevelopment 
Agency. In addition, the trial court had previously dismissed 
all claims against the individual defendants which are the 
subject of this appeal by order dated May 31, 1989 which was 
specifically incorporated into the April 22, 1991 Order and 
Judgment. (See Addendum). To the extent that Walker's appeal is 
directed toward any of these individual defendants, the arguments 
presented on behalf of Brigham City apply with equal force and 
effect to such individual defendants. 
3
 One example of the inaccurate and misleading nature of 
Walker's "facts" is found in the commentary of f 12 on page xi of 
Walker's Brief where he states that a comparison of the numbers 
he sets forth in ffl 10 and 11 indicate that the electric utility 
charges to rate-payers were "almost double that which was 
necessary" to cover expenses. 
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court "facts" that were never actually presented to the trial 
court in connection with his opposition to Defendants' Motion For 
Summary Judgment. See Record at 669-70. 
The following is an accurate statement of the undisputed 
material facts actually presented to the trial court in 
conjunction with Brigham City's Motion For Summary Judgment. 
None of the following facts were disputed by Walker with citation 
to supporting affidavits, deposition testimony or otherwise as 
provided in Rule 56, Utah R. Civ. P. See Record at 669-70. 
1. Brigham City is a municipal corporation which owns and 
operates an electrical utility. 
2. The City Council of Brigham City is the governing body 
of the City. (Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-105.) 
3. Utility rates are set by the City Council of Brigham 
City pursuant to resolution of the City Council. (Complaint, 
1 19, Rec. at 1.) 
4. Brigham City utility customers are given notice of the 
annual City budget hearing where they may contest matters 
As Walker has acknowledged, Brigham City owns and operates 
several utility services, including water, sewage, and 
electricity, and charges for those services are collected in a 
consolidated fund. Id. at f 3. The surplus amounts set forth in 
f 10 of Walker7s Brief are surpluses in the consolidated utility 
fund. They are not, as Walker would now have this Court believe, 
attributable only to electricity charges. In contrast, the 
numbers set forth in fl 11 of Walker's Brief pertain only to 
electricity expenses. Consequently, Walker is comparing apples 
and oranges. The "simple comparison of paragraphs 10 and 11" 
Walker suggests is not possible and does not indicate that rate-
payers were charged "almost double that necessary to provide the 
services..." 
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relating to electrical utility service charges. (Affidavit of 
Dennis Sheffield, Rec. at 652 - 54.) 
5. Plaintiff is a resident of Brigham City, Utah and is 
regularly charged and has paid charges to Brigham City for 
utility services provided by the City. (Complaint, f 1, Rec. at 
1.) 
6. Funds paid by utility customers are collected in the 
City's consolidated utility fund. (Affidavit of Dennis 
Sheffield, Rec. at 653.) 
7. A portion of the funds collected in the City's 
consolidated utility fund is transferred to the City's general 
fund. (Complaint, f 23, Rec. at 1.) 
8. Brigham City utility users are given notice in advance 
of transfers from the utility fund, specifically the electrical 
fund, to the City's general fund. (Affidavit of Dennis 
Sheffield, Rec. at 653.) 
9. The rate charged to Brigham City utility customers for 
electricity is lower than the rate charged to the average 
customer of Utah Power & Light. (Mark Stevens Deposition, p. 32; 
Rec. at 658.) 
10. The rate paid by Brigham City utility customers for 
electrical services is lower than the average monthly bill paid 
by utility customers in municipalities which own and operate 
their own power systems. (Id.) 
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11. The rates charged to utility customers in Brigham City 
are lower than the average rates charged by municipalities whose 
property tax bases most nearly approximate Brigham City and which 
operate their own electrical utilities. (Id. at 660-661.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE BRIGHAM CITY COUNCIL TO 
SET ELECTRICAL UTILITY RATES AT LEVELS THAT 
GENERATE REVENUES IN EXCESS OF THE COST OF 
PROVIDING ELECTRICAL UTILITY SERVICE IS A 
VALID EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION BY 
THE CITY COUNCIL AND SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED 
BY THIS COURT UNLESS FOUND TO BE SO 
UNREASONABLE AS TO BE ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS. 
In essence, Walker is asking the judicial branch of 
government to intervene in the legislative and discretionary 
functions of the Brigham City Council and hold that Brigham 
City's legitimate decision-making process in setting electrical 
utility rates is invalid. This court, however, should not 
involve itself in the rate setting process, McOuillin, Municipal 
Corporations, § 35.37a, 3rd ed. 1983. While a limited form of 
judicial review may be appropriate as to whether the rate setting 
procedure is so unreasonable as to be considered arbitrary and 
capricious, courts may not engage in rate making since that would 
represent an unwarranted intrusion into a legislative function, 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations. § 35.37a, 3rd ed. 1983. 
Utah courts have historically given considerable deference 
to the actions of the governing body of municipalities for the 
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same or substantially similar public policy considerations. As 
this Court stated the proposition in Clayton v. Salt Lake City, 
387 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1963): 
Inherent in the nature of its duties and its 
presumed superior knowledge and expertise in 
performing them, the public authority must have a 
wide latitude in which to exercise its judgment as 
to the best means of accomplishing that objective. 
The court is reluctant to interfere with the 
administrative function and would do so only if 
facts were shown to indicate dishonesty, fraud, 
collusion or lack of good faith in performing the 
duty mentioned. That is not demonstrated here. 
The same general policy was more recently iterated in 
Triangle Oil, Inc. v. North Salt Lake Corp., 609 P.2d. 1338 (Utah 
1980) : 
It has been found to be wise and proper judicial 
policy to exercise its [the judiciary7s] power with 
restraint, and not intrude into or interfere with the 
discretionary functions or policies of other 
departments of government. Accordingly, the courts 
generally will not so interfere with actions of a city 
council unless its action is outside of its authority 
or is so wholly discordant to reason and justice that 
its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary and 
thus in violation of the complainants rights. 
609 P.2d at 1340 (emphasis added). 
Courts in other states which have specifically addressed 
municipal utility rates have recognized a presumption of validity 
in rates set by municipal ordinance. Plaintiffs challenging such 
rates bear a heavy burden in showing they are unreasonable. 
Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Village of Pallatine, 496 N.E.2d at 
1002 (111. 1986). 
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In the instant case, Walker neither asserted nor provided 
any evidence to the trial court that Brigham City's utility rates 
resulted from dishonesty, fraud, or collusion. Likewise, Walker 
neither claimed nor provided any evidence at all that the rates 
were "wholly discordant with reason." With the required 
deference to the local government functions, the presumption of 
reasonableness clearly favors the position of Brigham City in 
this case. See Id. 
Because Walker completely failed to provide any evidence of 
unreasonableness to the trial court, this presumption itself 
would have been sufficient to support a summary judgment in 
Brigham City's favor. Nonetheless, Brigham City provided the 
trial court with further evidence of the reasonableness of its 
rates in the form of deposition testimony and affidavits. (Rec. 
at 652-664.) 
Brigham City's Memorandum in support of its Motion For 
Partial Summary Judgment presented evidence in the form of 
deposition testimony from Mark Stevens, a CPA, regarding charges 
for utility services. Stevens's testimony established that rates 
charged by Brigham City are lower than rates charged for similar 
service by Utah Power & Light Company and other municipally owned 
and operated utilities of similar size to Brigham City. Record at 
658 -661. 
Walker provided the trial court with no evidence at all to 
refute Brigham City's evidence of the reasonableness of its 
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utility rates. Walker merely attempted, as he does again on 
appeal, to equate "unreasonableness" with any revenue exceeding 
operating costs. In his Brief, the only supporting evidence 
Walker cites is the deposition testimony of an accountant to the 
effect that Brigham City's utility revenues have exceeded costs 
and that Mr. Walker's payments are "in excess of a pro rata rate 
for the cost to Brigham City of services rendered to Mr. Walker." 
Walker Brief, pp. 18-19. As discussed above, whether revenues 
exceed costs is essentially irrelevant. The only issue properly 
presented to the trial court on summary judgment was the 
reasonableness of the rates. 
"In evaluating whether the evidence reveals a genuine issue 
of material fact ..., [the court] must take into consideration 
the eventual standard of proof, at trial on the merits, of each 
element of ... [the] claim." Weber v. Sprinqville City, 725 P.2d 
1360 (Utah 1986); Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 
740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987). Brigham City presented evidence 
of the reasonableness of the utility rates and that evidence was 
never controverted with competent evidence by Walker. 
The undisputed evidence before the trial court was that 
Brigham City's utility rates are reasonable compared to the rates 
charged by other comparable utilities, both regulated and 
unregulated. Based on that conclusion, the trial court properly 
deferred to the exercise of legislative discretion by the Brigham 
City Council and refrained from involving itself in the rate 
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setting process for all of the public policy reasons more fully 
discussed above. Where no material issues of fact regarding the 
reasonableness of Brigham City's utility rates were presented to 
the trial court, summary judgment for defendants was mandatory. 
POINT II 
BRIGHAM CITY'S RATES FOR ELECTRICAL UTILITY SERVICE 
CHARGES ARE REASONABLE FOR THE SERVICE PROVIDED AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
A municipality which owns and operates a public utility is 
exercising its business powers and may conduct the activity in a 
manner which promises the greatest benefit to the City. The 
process of setting rates for utility services by a municipality 
is a legislative act and authority for the act is vested in the 
governing body of the municipality. McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations, § 35.37, 3rd ed. 1983. Unless the municipality's 
exercise of discretion is in bad faith or ultra vires, courts 
should not interfere with the reasonable legislative decision 
making process of the City Council. McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations, § 35.27, 3rd ed. 1983; Triangle Oil, Inc. v. North 
Salt Lake Corp.. 609 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Utah 1980); Enterprise. 
Inc. v. Nampa City. 536 P.2d 729 (Idaho 1975). 
A. Brigham City is authorized to charge reasonable rates. 
Brigham City's authority to own and operate its utility 
works is established by Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-1 et seq. 
Section 55-3-10 addresses the topic of the rates Brigham City may 
charge for these services: 
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Rates for service to be reasonable and uniform - May be 
revised. 
Rates for services furnished by any project or service 
as described in Section 55-3-1 hereof shall be 
reasonable and uniform in respect to class at all 
times. They may be fixed precedent to the issuance of 
the bonds. Such rates shall be sufficient to provide 
for the payment of the interest upon and principal of 
all such bonds as and when the same become due and 
payable, to create a bond and interest sinking fund 
therefor, to provide for the payment of the expenses of 
administration and operation and such expenses for the 
maintenance of the project or service, necessary to 
preserve the same in good repair and working order, to 
build up a reserve for depreciation, to build up a 
reserve for improvements, betterments and extensions 
other than those necessary to maintain the same in good 
repair and working order, and to pay the interest on 
and principal of any other bonds or obligations 
outstanding and issued in connection with the purchase, 
construction, repair or improvement of the project or 
service. Such rates may be fixed and revised from time 
to time so as to produce these amounts, and the 
governing body may covenant and agree in the ordinance 
or other legislative enactment authorizing the issuance 
of such bonds and on the face of each bond at all times 
to maintain such rates for services furnished by the 
project or service as shall be sufficient to provide 
for the foregoing, but not in excess of a reasonable 
rate for the services rendered. 
This provision clearly provides that the service rates "shall be 
sufficient" to cover the costs and expenses specifically 
enumerated. The only limit § 55-3-10 places on rates is they not 
exceed a "reasonable rate for the service rendered." 
In his Brief, Walker argues, without authority, that § 55-3-
10 provides that the charges may not exceed amounts sufficient to 
cover the enumerated expenses. Walker Brief, pp. 2-4. Clearly, 
if this had been the legislature's intent, it would have included 
language to that effect and all references to "reasonable rate 
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for the service" would have been eliminated. The very title of 
the provision makes this abundantly clear: "Rates for service to 
be reasonable and uniform - may be revised." 
There appears to be no case law in this state directly 
interpreting the "reasonableness" provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 55-3-10, which is not surprising given the relatively clear 
language of the statute. It is, however, well recognized in 
other jurisdictions that in setting utility rates, municipalities 
are not restricted to charging rates based solely on the costs of 
providing such services. 
For example, in Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura, 729 P.2d 
186, 192 (Cal. 1986), the California Supreme Court found that an 
entity of local government could charge and collect fees for 
services, such as a municipal utility system, and use the net 
proceeds of such enterprises "for the benefit of its own general 
fund." The California Court further noted that "parks, 
playgrounds, public utilities, and other facilities in aid of the 
health and welfare of the community . . . may be operated for 
profit." [Emphasis in original]. Finally, the California Court 
held that "it is for the local governing body to determine 
precise rates and whether the system should be subsidized or 
profitable." 
Similarly, in Chocolay Charter Township v. City of 
Marquette, 358 N.W.2d 636, 638 (Mich. 1984) the Michigan Court of 
Appeals recognized, "A municipality is not required to furnish 
- 15 -
utility services at cost, but may charge a rate which will yield 
a profit." See also. Inland real Estate Corp. v. Village of 
Pallatine, 496 N.E.2d 998, 1002 (111. 1986); Killian v. City of 
Paris, 241 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tenn. 1951); and City of Corning v. 
Iowa/Nebraska Light & Power Co., 282 N.W. 791, 799 (Iowa 1938). 
McQuillin, a recognized authority in the area of municipal law, 
agrees with this position: f,A city is entitled to a reasonable 
profit and may even use that profit for other valid municipal 
purposes." McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 35.37c, 3rd ed. 
1988. 
B. Fees for electrical utility services may permissibly 
generate revenues which exceed the cost of providing 
such services. 
Under Point III of his Brief, Walker makes the convoluted 
argument that utility charges are not taxes, but rather fees, and 
because municipalities may raise revenues only through taxes, 
Brigham City is not permitted to raise revenues through utility 
charges. Walker's simplistic argument fails to recognize that 
there are essentially two distinct types of fees. These are: 
1) licensing or permit fees for regulatory processes, and 2) 
fees for specific services. He mistakenly bases his argument 
completely on cases discussing licensing fees and regulatory 
measures. None of these cases supports his position. 
Walker first cites Mountain States Telephone v. Salt Lake 
County, 702 P.2d 113 (Utah 1985), where the only issue considered 
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by the court was whether the county could levy a utility license 
tax as a condition to the granting of a franchise for the use of 
public rights of way. As Walker notes in his Brief, the court 
quoted City of Chicago Heights v. Public Service Co., 97 N.E.2d 
807 (111. 1951), in which an Illinois court "struck down an 
ordinance which imposed license fees greatly in excess of the 
reasonable cost of regulating the use of city streets." Mountain 
States, 702 P.2d at 118. Thus the court focused on the 
reasonable relationship between licensing revenues and the cost 
of regulation. Id. 
Another case relied upon by Walker is Consolidated Coal Co. 
v. Emery County, 702 P.2d 121 (Utah 1985). Consolidated Coal 
concerns the validity of an Emery County business license 
ordinance. The court expressly held that Utah counties are not 
permitted "to raise revenues through licensing except insofar as 
such revenue is necessary to (and therefore proportionate to the 
cost of) regulation of the licensed entities." The court found 
that the ordinance in question was invalid because it had 
"little, if any, regulatory purpose or effect." 702 P.2d at 127. 
Thus, as in Mountain States, the court discussed only the 
reasonable relation between licensing revenues and the cost of 
regulation. 
Walker also cites Lafferty v. Pavson City, 642 P.2d 376 
(Utah 1982), Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 
P.2d 899 (Utah 1981), and Call v. City of West Jordan, 614 p.2d 
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1257 (Utah 1980). All three of these cases involve ordinances 
requiring impact or connection fees from a builder as a 
prerequisite to final approval of the builder's plat or building 
permit. Again, the ordinances in question were regulatory 
measures. 
Brigham City recognizes that these cases cited by Walker 
support the proposition that local governmental regulatory fees 
are required under state law to be reasonably related to the 
costs of regulation. This case, however, involves only fees for 
specific services - the same services which, in some communities, 
are provided by investor-owned utility companies. Brigham City's 
charges are not imposed as a prerequisite of any city 
certification or regulatory action or as payment for future 
services or costs. They are rather contractual service charges 
for services which plaintiff voluntarily used. As discussed 
above, the only restriction is that the fees be at a "reasonable 
rate for the services rendered." Utah Code Ann. § 55-3-10. 
Walker has not cited a single case which states that fees 
for specific, nonregulatory, services cannot exceed the cost of 
providing those services. The courts should not intrude into 
this decision making process unless there is a showing, by 
competent evidence, that the rates charged are without any 
rational basis or are otherwise so unreasonable as to be 
completely arbitrary and capricious. 
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The undisputed evidence on the limited question of 
"reasonableness" in this case demonstrates that Brigham City's 
rates are not unreasonable, as more fully set forth under 
Point I, supra. and the trial Court properly declined to 
substitute its judgment for that of the Brigham City Council. 
Accordingly, Walker's challenge to the wisdom of this exercise of 
the legislative body's discretion was properly dismissed as a 
matter of law. 
POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS NO PROTECTED PROPERTY 
INTEREST OR CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS TO CHALLENGE 
THE RATES CHARGED FOR UTILITY SERVICES BY 
BRIGHAM CITY. 
Walker alleges, in conclusory fashion, that the electrical 
utility rates charged by Brigham City somehow violate the takings 
clause of the Utah Constitution. He fails, however, to identify 
any protected or recognized property interest sufficient to 
invoke the protection of either constitutional provision. 
Article I# § 22 of the Utah Constitution provides, "Private 
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without 
just compensation." Before being entitled to recover under this 
provision, Walker must identify "some protectible property 
interest." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 625 
(Utah 1990). 
It is difficult to ascertain the nature of the protected 
interest Walker is claiming in this case. While continued 
utility service has been recognized as a protected property 
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interest, which may not be terminated except for cause and after 
reasonable notice, Walker has failed to show that any such 
protected property interest is involved in this case. Walker can 
only recover for the taking of property to the extent that 
property exists and to the extent that he has legal rights in 
that property. Id. at 626. 
As Walker has acknowledged (Walker Brief, p. 4), the Utah 
Supreme Court has taken the position of the majority of states 
that charges imposed by municipalities upon their residents for 
utility services are not considered taxes or assessments, but 
rather charges for services. Ponderosa One Ltd. Partnership v. 
Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary Dist., 738 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 
1987)(citing Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Salt Lake v. Provo 
City, 503 P.2d 451 (Utah 1972) and Murray City v. Bd. of 
Education. 396 P.2d 628 (Utah 1964)). 
Walker has chosen to avail himself of the utility services 
provided by the City. With respect to these services, his 
relationship with the City is contractual. There is no element 
of deprivation in this case, only one of contract. Walker has 
received the benefits of utility services from the city and the 
cost of those services was properly determined by elected City 
officials. Under these circumstances there can be no deprivation 
of property within the meaning of the Utah Constitution, Art. I, 
§ 22. Cf. Carson v. Brockton Sewerage Comm'n, 182 U.S. 398 
(1901) . 
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In his Brief, Walker takes language out of context from 
various cases and, without explanation, alleges that the same 
language applies to this case. It does not. 
Of the six cases Walker cites in support of his "takings" 
claim, four again involve fees for permits - not services.4 
Walker Brief, pp. 13-15 (citing Call v. City of West Jordan , 614 
P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980); Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Kansas City 
v. Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Mo. 1977); Weber Basin Home 
Builders Ass'n v. Rov City, 487 P.2d 866 (Utah 1971); City of 
Chicago Heights v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 94 N.E.2d 306 
(111. 1950)). Call concerned a developer's challenge to a city 
ordinance requiring subdividers to dedicate 7% of proposed 
subdivision land to the city or pay that value in cash to be used 
for flood control and/or park and recreation facilities. 614 P.2d 
1257. The Court simply held that, to prevail on their takings 
claim, plaintiffs would have to "show that the dedication 
required of them had no reasonable relationship to the needs ... 
created by their subdivision." Id. at 1259. The court went on to 
say that the benefit for which the dedication would pay need not 
be solely to the particular subdivision, but only that there be 
some demonstrable benefit to it. Id. 
Even if Brigham City's charges for utility service were 
analogous to the dedication requirement on subdividers addressed 
4
 See discussion regarding distinction between fees for 
services and fees for permits, supra pp. 16-18. 
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in Call, there is no question that Walker has received some 
demonstrable benefit. It is undisputed that Walker received 
utility service from Brigham City. 
Weber Basin concerned an action brought by an association of 
builders challenging an ordinance increasing building permit 
fees. The question considered by the Court was: 
whether the ordinance, in its practical operation, 
results in an unjust discrimination by imposing a 
greater burden of the cost of city government on one 
class of persons as compared to another, without any 
proper basis for such differentiation and 
classification. 
487 P.2d at 868. The question of a taking under Art. I, § 22 of 
the Utah Constitution was not even addressed. Weber Basin, thus, 
has no bearing on the instant case. Even if Walker were 
complaining of unjust discrimination, there is no evidence that 
Walker,s utility bills are any different from those of any other 
similarly situated resident of Brigham City. 
The remaining two cases are also easily legally and 
factually distinguished from the instant case. In Conoco, Inc. 
v. Louisiana Public Service Comm'n, 520 So.2d 404 (La. 1988), the 
Louisiana Supreme Court considered only whether a contract 
between Conoco and Enterprise Pipeline was impaired by a tariff 
imposed by the Public service Commission and whether an 
impairment would violate the proscription against impairment of 
contracts in the Louisiana Constitution. The case did not 
involve recognition of Walker's proposition that there is some 
sort of protected property or constitutional interest in low 
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utility rates. In State of North Carolina, ex rel Utilities 
Comm'n v. Edminsten, 263 S.E.2d 583 (N.C. 1980) the North 
Carolina Court discussed the public service commission's 
responsibility to set rates for utilities as low as permissible 
without violating the utility company's constitutional rights to 
a fair return. None of these cases recognizes that a consumer 
has a constitutionally protectible property interest in rates 
paid for utility services, particularly where the service is 
owned and operated by a municipality, like Brigham City. 
There are very limited circumstances in which courts may 
consider claims of this nature, such as the termination of 
electrical utility services without notice and hearing. 
Otherwise, they traditionally involve claims of confiscatory 
taking from the utility because rates for investor-owned 
utilities are arbitrarily set at such a low level as to destroy a 
protected property interest by not allowing a reasonable rate of 
return. 
An example of such a case which addresses utility rates in 
the context of a claim for unconstitutional taking is Duquesne 
Light Company v. Barasch, 109 S. Ct. 609 (1989). In Duquesne, 
the court found that the federal constitution protects utilities 
from being limited to a charge for their property which is so low 
and therefore so "unjust" as to be confiscatory. "A rate is too 
low if it is 'so unjust' as to destroy the value of [the 
property] for all the purposes for which it was acquired, and in 
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so doing practically deprive[s] the owner of property without due 
process of law." Obviously, Duquesne gives no support to 
Walker's argument. 
Walker's claim against Brigham City is that the City's 
charges for utility services are too high. This claim is simply 
not of constitutional magnitude. 
CONCLUSION 
Walker fails to set forth any claim or theory which would 
justify a further review by this Court of the legitimate exercise 
of legislative discretion by the Brigham City Council and the 
wisdom and judgment involved in their decisions regarding rates 
charged for electrical utility services and the transfer of any 
surpluses to the general fund. The process used by Brigham City 
to fix rates by resolution of the City Council and its practice 
of conducting public budget hearings, sending notice of transfers 
from the electrical fund to the general fund and the normal 
elective process for the City Council provide the plaintiff with 
abundant due process and fairness. In fact, this subject was 
specifically raised as a campaign issue in recent Brigham City 
municipal elections. 
In effect, any analogy to the role of the Public Service 
Commission in regulating rates of investor-owned utilities is not 
applicable because the "rate payers" and "owners" are essentially 
the same group, consisting of the residents, property owners and 
voters of Brigham City. 
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This is not the appropriate forum in which to question the 
wisdom of the exercise of legislative discretion on the part of 
the Brigham City Council. Walkers "remedy," if he has one, is 
through persuasion of his elected representatives in public 
hearings and meetings in which rates are established for 
electrical utility services and transfers of any surpluses to the 
general fund are approved or a resort to the ballot box in future 
elections of Brigham City officials. As one court noted in a 
similar context in Silver v. City of Los Angeles, 366 P.2d 651, 
653 (Ca. 1962):^S5'^^0 A K^C 
-J \X 
Under such circumstances, they are answerable to the 
electorate, but not the courts, if they were mistaken 
or wanting in business acumen. 
For all the reasons set forth above, Walker's Appeal should 
be dismissed and the Summary Judgment of the trial court 
affirmed. 
DATED t h i s t _ 2 . day of October , 1992 . 
WII/£JAMS & flUNT 
By _ 
H NT 
7\ DuAHJZfih" 
Jody/K Eunrnett 
KurttjM. Frankenburg 
Attorneys for defendants/Appellees 
#15763 
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City Corporation and Co-Counsel 
for Brigham City Redevelopment 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEO A. WALKER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIGHAM CITY, PETER C. 
KNUDSON, BETH W. CURRISTER, 
DAVID G. HACKING, DEE J. 
HAMMON, ROBERT B. SHELTON and 
MARK A. WALKER, REDEVELOPMENT 
AGENCY NO. 1 OF BRIGHAM CITY, 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY NO. 2 OF 
BRIGHAM CITY, MICHAEL T. 
COSGROVE, and JOHN OR JANE 
DOES I THROUGH X, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 870030069 
Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Both 
parties submitted memoranda and the Court heard oral argument on 
February 25, 1991. The Court has considered the memoranda 
submitted by counsel, the arguments of counsel, affidavits and 
other evidence presented with the memoranda. The court has also 
reviewed its prior Memorandum Decision (issued August 11. 1988, and 
Case No, -
M I C R O F I L M E D ADD 0 0 10 
modified April 12, 1989) granting defendants1 Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on Claims One through Six and denying plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the memoranda submitted by 
the parties in conjunction with that decision. Being fully 
advised, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision, dated March 27, 
1991, granting defendants1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The Court now enters this Order and Judgment granting defendants1 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants1 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Claims Seven through Twelve 
is granted. On those claims there are no disputes of material fact 
and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The 
Court adopts and incorporates by reference its Memorandum Decision 
dated March 27, 1991. This case has been bifurcated on stipulation 
of the parties and Order of the Court. The Court expressly 
determines, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
that there is no just reason for delay, and, accordingly, this 
Order and the Courtfs prior Order dated May 31, 1989, expressly 
constitute final judgment for the defendants on Claims One through 
Twelve. Further proceedings on the remaining claims, which have 
been bifurcated, are stayed, pending appeal and resolution of the 
Court's decision granting summary judgment on Claims One through 
Twelve. Parties to bear their own costs and attorney's fees. 
-2-
Plaintiff is advised that he has thirty (30) days from the date of 
entry of this Order to appeal. 
DATED this XS day of April, 1991. 
BY THE COURT 
Gordon J . Lov^Di^tTI^rtr-Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Robert R. Wallace 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
35\clb\15362.001\order 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEO A. WALKER, ] 
Plaintiff 
vs. ] 
BRIGHAM CITY, PETER C. ] 
KNUDSON, BETH W. GURRISTER, ] 
DAVID G. HACKING, DEE J. ) 
HAMMON, ROBERT B. SHELTON, and ) 
MARK A. WALKER, REDEVELOPMENT ] 
AGENCY NO. 1 OF BRIGHAM CITY, ] 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY NO. 2 OF ] 
BRIGHAM CITY: MICHAEL T. ] 
COSGROVE, and JOHN OR JANE ] 
DOES I THROUGH X, ] 
Defendants ] 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) CASE NO. 870030069 
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon the Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
The Plaintiff bases his claim partially on the allegation 
that the action by the city of charging rates, which he argues 
are unreasonably high, is amoung other things an 
unconstitutional taking. For reasons set forth in the 
Defendant's Memorandum and Reply Memorandum this Court agrees 
that the issue here does not necessarily rise to the level of 
constitutional magnitude. 
The city does not argue that the Plaintiff may challenge 
the rate making process, or more specifically the rate levels, 
and agrees that this Court has the power to review the rate 
making process to determine if it is free from arbitrary and 
capricious exercise of power and that rates are reasonable for 
^^HOSWML(S9-76A 
c3^7 1 9 9 1 
M I C R O F I L M E D *"rV/f(fy/jyt T^ 
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the service provided. 
The two approaches are directly related. The Court has the 
power to review either the rates or the rate setting procedure 
where the rates are so unreasonable as to be the result of 
arbitrary and capricious action. Caution obviously has to be 
exercised in order not to intrude in an unwarranted fashion on 
the legislative function, nor to make the Court a rate making 
body. 
This Court observed at the hearing, that if the legislature 
wanted to limit the municipality's power to charge rates in 
excess of those necessary to cover the costs, etc., it could 
readily have done so. The Legislature did provide that the 
rates charged are to be sufficient to provide for payment of 
the interest and principle, to create funds, pay for 
administration and operation, maintenance, depreciation 
reserve, impropriety, etc. It neither specifically allowed or 
precluded profit - over and above that necessary for the above 
mentioned purposes. 
It is apparent from the language that the Legislature 
envisioned the municipality charging enough to provide the 
service in order that the service be not dependent on taxes or 
other revenues to support the same. What the statute however 
does not say is that, "such rates shall only be sufficient to 
provide such payments, etc.". Had it done so, the Plaintiff's 
argument would be easier to approach. 
Moreover, both parties appear to agree that the 
municipality may, though not specifically authorized by the 
statute or prohibited therefrom, charge enough for a reasonable 
profit to be realized. The statute neither mentions nor 
Walker vs. Brigham City 
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defines "reasonable profit", but does mention rather 
"reasonable rates", specifically, "reasonable rate for the 
service rendered". The issue then before us on this Motion for 
Summary Judgment is whether there are facts in dispute as to 
the allegation that Brigham City officials acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously in setting the rates for utility services and or 
are the rates unreasonably high. 
Defendant would separate the actual consideration of the 
rates from the rate setting process. This Court is not so sure 
that that can be done. If the rates are unreasonably high then 
it may follow the process or acts of the Brigham City officials 
would therefore have to be likewise unreasonable, arbitrary or 
capricious. The task of the Court it seems then, is first to 
define "reasonable rates" by finding the legal standards to 
apply/ then examine the rates charged to determine their 
reasonableness. 
The parties introduced affidavits and portions of 
transcripts of depositions stating that the rates
 > charged by 
Brigham City are related to those charged by investor owned 
utilities and utilities owned and operated by municipalities of 
a similar size. Plaintiffs Affidavit states that, among other 
things, the rates charged are higher than needed for payment 
and maintenance as provided by the statute and that the excess 
funds are transferred to a general fund used for other public 
purposes. 
Though the Defendants argue that this is not the 
appropriate forum in which to question the wisdom of the 
legislative discretion on the part of the Brigham City council, 
the Defendant does admit that if in fact the Brigham City 
Walker vs. Brigham City 
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council acted arbitrarily or unreasonably in establishing these 
rates or if the rates are unreasonably high then review by this 
review is proper. 
No allegations are made or supported for the purpose of 
this Motion that the city's procedure of establishing the rates 
is improper, that it failed to comply with the statutory 
provisions or municipal ordinance in establishing the rates 
except that the rates are higher than needed to provide for the 
cost of production as envisioned by the statute and that the 
rates were established with the intent of producing a surplus 
to be transferred to the general fund. The actual procedure 
with which the city undertook to set the rates, other than 
above stated, is not challenged. (There was some argument by 
the Plaintiff that historically the city did not comply with 
the statutory requirements, but since this action is for 
injunctive relief that issue is not particularly material for 
this Motion for Summary Judgment.) 
The Defendant has argued that reasonableness is a matter of 
fact and this Court stated earlier in a Memorandum Decision 
issued on August 11, 1988, that facts are necessary to 
determine whether the rates being charged are excessive or 
unreasonable. For cited authorities the Plaintiff has argued 
that in the Ventura case (Hansen vs. the Citv of 
San-Buenaventura, 729 P.2d 186 California 1986) involved only a 
3% return on the rates wherein this case there is a 30% rate of 
return. Defendant has cited Triangle Oil, Inc. vs. North Salt 
Lake Corporation, 609 P.2d 1338 (1980) for the principle that 
the Court should exercise its powers of review only if it is 
shown that the exercise of municipal power is, "so wholly 
Walker vs. Brigham City 
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discordant to reason and justice that its actions must be 
deemed capricious and arbitrary and thus in violation of the 
complainant's rights"• 
The problem lies in discussing rates of return as opposed 
to rates for services rendered. The statute does not preclude 
any certain rate of return or profit, what it does require is a 
reasonable rate for the service rendered. The question then is 
not one of percentage of profit; i.e., rate of return but rate 
charged for the value of the service rendered. That is what 
the Court suggested in the August 11, 1988, Memorandum 
Decision, that fees may not be in excess of the value of the 
service provided. The city is not precluded bv that statute 
from obtaining a certain rate of return, even a high rate of 
return or profit, but it is precluded from charging a rate not 
reasonable for than the value of the service rendered. This is 
likely so because the city is the only provider of that 
service. If the city charged rates greatly in excess of the 
value of the service rendered, and since it is the only 
provider in Brigham City by state law, then that rate would be 
unreasonable and violative of the statute. 
Contrary then to the Plaintiff's argument it would appear 
that the determination of the value of the service rendered 
must take into comparison the rates charged for similar 
services provided to other consumers. That would necessarily 
require an analysis of the rates charged by other municipal 
providers and by other non-municipal providers. The cost of 
producing the power by each individual provider is not the 
bench mark against which the rate charged is compared, but 
rather it is the value of the product provided or service 
Walker vs. Brigham City 
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rendered. 
Value is generally determined by what the consumer is 
willing to pay. Economics dictate that the higher the rate 
charged perhaps the less the consumer is willing to buy and the 
lower the rate charged the more the consumer is willing to 
buy. However, because the Plaintiff and other individuals in 
his position are a "captive consumer" it seems to this Court 
that the amount other consumers are paying here and elsewhere 
is a better criteria for determining reasonableness than the 
costs of production as the best analysis of the value of the 
service rendered. The term "reasonable", as used in the 
statute should be defined by comparison. Stated another way 
the city then is not restricted to a cost basis analysis to 
determine its reasonable rates, but the reasonable rates are to 
be determined by the value of the service rendered. The only 
way to reasonably determine the value of that service rendered 
is to compare like services and rates. 
If the city were selling its power for substantially higher 
rates than like services provided by other providers or if the 
city were selling its power for rates considerably lower than 
sufficient to provide for maintenance of the costs as required 
by statute then the Plaintiff's argument would be well taken. 
But the uncontested fact that the city is charging rates 
reasonably comparable to those charged by other providers, even 
though higher than they need to in order to cover costs, does 
not demonstrate that the rates are unreasonably high or that 
the city acted unreasonably in exercise of its legislative 
power. If the city government wants to charge less than what 
it is charging now, but still sufficient to cover the costs, it 
Walker vs. Brigham City 
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may do so under the statute but that is a legislative function 
to be controlled by the City Council and is an area in which 
the Court should not intervene. Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is therefore granted. Counsel for the Defendant is 
directed to prepare a formal Order in conformance herewith. 
Gordon J. Low 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION, postage prepaid to the following: 
Robert R. Wallace, Attorney at Law, 4 Triad Center STE 500, P.O. Box 
2970, Salt Lake City, UT 84110, Jody K. Burnett and Craig L. 
Barlow, Attorneys at Law, 10 Exchange Place, 11th Fir., P.O. box 
45000, Salt Lake City, UT 841110, Merrill G. Hansen and James I. 
Watts, Attorneys at Law, 1245 Brickyard Road Dr., STE 600, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84106 and Ben Hadfield and Jeff R. Thorne, Attorneys at 
Law, P.O. Box F, Brigham City, UT 84302. 
DATED this 2nd day of April, 1991. 
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JODY K BURNETT 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEO A. WALKER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
BRIGHAM CITY CORPORATION, 
PETER C. KNUDSON, BETH W. 
GURRISTER, DAVID G. HACKING, 
DEE J. HAMMON, ROBERT B. 
SHELTON, and MARK A. WALKER, 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY NO. 1 
OF BRIGHAM CITY, REDEVELOPMENT 
AGENCY NO. 2 OF BRIGHAM CITY, 
MICHAEL T. COSGROVE, and 
JOHN or JANE DOES I through 
X, 
ORDER 
Civil No. 870030069 
Defendants. 
On March 21, 19 89 the parties, through counsel appeared 
before the Court for argument on several motions, including 
plaintiff's and defendants' Motions for Partial Summary 
Judgment. The plaintiff was represented by Robert R. Wallace 
and defendants were represented by Jeff Thorne, Merrill Hansen 
and Craig L. Barlow. The parties had submitted MemoranT-ra.eriri • • • 
M I C R Q F I..L M E C M I C R O F I 1 M F D 
MAY 311989 
support of their motions opposing the motions. On 
August 11, 1988 this Court issued a Memorandum Decision 
on both Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. The plaintiff 
had not submitted a memorandum in response to the defendants1 
motion at the time the Memorandum Decision was issued despite 
the fact that counsel for defendants had agreed that the 
plaintiff could have additional time to file a responsive 
memorandum. The Court allowed the plaintiff to submit a 
reply memorandum and has now reviewed all of the memoranda 
submitted as well as the Court's file of the entire matter 
and considered the arguments of counsel. Based on the Court's 
review and analysis its Memorandum Decision of August 11, 1988 
granting defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
claims 1 through 6 of plaintiff's Amended Complaint remains 
the Court's decision in this case. The Court also grants the 
defendants Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Leo Walker 
submitted in support of plaintiff's Memorandum Opposing 
defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court 
finds there are no disputes of material issues of fact and the 
defendants are entitled to summary judgment on claims 1 through 
6 of the plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Therefore, it is 
hereby 
- 0 -
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment is granted, with prejudice and 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, parties 
to bear their own costs. 
DATED this ^ / J ^ ^ay of May, 1989. 
FIRST DISTRICT COURT: '--
Judge Gordon J. Low 
AS TO FORM: 
Robert R. Wallace 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEO A. WALKER 
VS 
Plaintiff 
BRIGHAM CITY UTAH 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 870030069 
- ^ 
a 
On the 11th day of August, 1988f this Court issued a 
Memorandum Decision on both parties Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Plaintiff however was not given an opportunity to submit 
his reply memorandum to the Defendant's Motion. 
This Court has now received that reply and also heard 
argument on the matter. After reviewing the entire matter, both 
in pleadings and in argument, the Court's earlier decision 
remains. The Plaintiff has not shown that he has been deprived 
of due process, procedural or substantive or that he is being 
deprived of equal protection of the laws. 
In support of this argument, an affidavit was filed to 
which a Motion to Strike, as the affidavit applies to these 
matters is granted. The Memorandum Decision earlier issued in this 
case is affirmed (except for those provisions wherein there are 
obviously typographical errors.) 
Counsel for the Defendant is directed to prepare a formal 
order in conformance herewith. 
U C R O F I L M E D 
WJ-fftoW N o . i g ^ ^ P a t e d t h i s 12+h day 
M I C R O F I L M E D 
FILED 
Number* 
APR 7 •] I9P,Q 
-to 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
********************** 
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of April 1989, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision, postage prepaid too, Robert R. Wallace, Attorney for 
the Plaintiff, 4 Triad Center, Suite 500, P. 0. Box 2970, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84110 and to Craig Barlow & Jody K. Burnett, 
Attorney's for the Defendant, 10 Exchange Place #1100, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84145, and to Jeff Thorne, Attorney for the Defendant, 
P. 0. Box "F", 98 North Main, Brigham City, Utah 84302 and to 
Merrill G. Hansen, Attorney for the Defendant, 1245 Brickyard 
Plaza, #600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106. 
f~l! - " ) " 77^1 J / / //i*-^ 
Christine Morrison 
Deputy Court Clerk 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEO WALKER 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
BRIGHAM CITY ET AL 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
FILE NO. 870030069 
In this matter Leo Walker has filed a motion for 
Summary Judgment, seeking therein a Declaratory Judgment, that 
the electrical utility fees charged by Brigham City, 
Corporation to its customers are excessive and 
unconstitutional and for an injunction enjoining Brigham City 
Corporation from collection of excess fees for utility 
services, an injunction preventing Brigham City from 
collecting the ]dfurposed $2.00 per month additional fee for an 
electrical service and for attorney fees; 
The relationship between the action for Summary 
Judgment and the specific causes of action in the complaint is 
unclear. The Plaintiff alleges the grounds for the motion are 
that the charges made by Brigham City for Utility Services are 
excessive and constitute a taking of Plaintiff's property 
without constitutional due process, therefore in violation of 
both Federal and State Constitutions and the excessive charges 
are violative of the Utah Code annotated. Section 55-3-3. 
There appears to be no dispute that between the years 
1983 and 1987, the Defendant, Brigham City collected funds in 
charges for utility services and transferred certain of thos ¥746&067ni 
M I C R O F I L M E D 
M**ft0 
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funds into the City's general fund. The funds collected were 
in excess of the sums of moneys required to operate the 
electrical services provided by the city. Further allegations 
are that during 1988 the City will transfer $1,275,858.00 from 
the Utility Funds to the General Fund, that those funds 
represent monies in excess of expenses relating to the 
providing of electrical utility services. In addition thereto 
the City is proposing a $2.00 per month electrical hook-up fee 
for all persons using utilities during 1988-89. Neither of 
the cases cited under section 1 of the Plaintiff's brief are 
directly on point but are argued to be applicable by inference 
or by implication. 
It appears to the Court that one focal point of this 
issue is what is meant under Section 55-3-10 of the Utah Code 
annotated where in the City is authorized to charge rates for 
services provided but not in excess of those "reasonable for 
service rendered". Plaintiff argues that because the City 
charges more for its electrical service than it needed to meet 
the expense of providing this the service, it is therefore in 
excess of a "reasonable rate for the service rendered". No 
evidence or facts are supplied relative to what is a 
"reasonable rate for the service rendered". In other words 
though the City may be charging more for the service than it 
costs the City to provide the same, that may not be 
dispositive of the question of whether the charge is in excess 
of "reasonable rate for service rendered". 
The Court is left unaware of the facts as to whether 
the Plaintiff is receiving his moneys worth or if the rate is 
"reasonable for the service" he is provided or even how and if 
that could be calculated. But it seems overly simplistic to 
conclude that since the City receives more than it expends 
related to electrical service that therefore its rate is "in 
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excess of a reasonable rate for the service rendered". It 
seems to the Court that far more information and facts are 
needed before Summary Judgment can be granted on that issue. 
The Defendant further argues since that this is not a class 
action, Plaintiff must therefore be able to show that the 
service charges he pays individually are unreasonable. Again 
those are further facts which are not supplied and are of 
which the Court is unaware at this juncture. Whether the 
Plaintiff's claim is cognizable under the Federal Statute 
cited in the complaint cannot at this time be determined. 
The Plaintiff's second point essentially is that the 
charging by the City of excessive fees not reasonably related 
to the services being provided is a taking of property in 
violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. The threshold 
problem in this section of the Plaintiff's argument is the 
same as the first, that is this Court is without sufficient 
facts to determine whether the fees being charged are 
excessive fees, unreasonably related to the service provided. 
The fees obviously are in excess of the cost of 
providing the service but they may not be in excess of the 
value of the service received. Further facts must be provided 
the Court on that issue. The Court distinguishes the case of 
Weber Basin Hombuilder Association vs. Roy City as there was 
apparently no showing by Roy City, that it had experienced a 
commensurate increase in the cost of running the building 
department, therefore justifying the increase from $10.00 to 
$112.00 in building permits.The builder was receiving no real 
benefit from the issuance of the building permit and therefore 
it was easily determined that the increase to $112.00 was not 
reasonably related to the service provided. In this case 
however the Plaintiff is apparently receiving electrical 
service and the question is whether or not what he pays for it 
2 
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is "reasonably related to the service provided". The 
defendant further argues in response to point 2, that the 
exact nature of the property right which the Plaintiff 
alleges that he is being denied must at the on-set be 
determined and that the Plaintiff has failed to identify the 
same. 
Obviously if the Plaintiff refused to pay what he 
considers to be an excessive rate, that the utility service 
will be discontinuted, therefore depriving him of a property 
right which can only be done so legally if in fact the charges 
are not excessive; otherwise the termination may be illegal 
and an unconstitutional taking. Before we get to that issue, 
the question of excess charges and the questions of the 
charges and their reasonableness and the relationship to the 
service rendered must be determined. 
The Plaintifffs request therefore under point 2, for 
Summary Judgment is denied and the claim under point 3, for 
Attorney Fees is premature and therefore also denied. 
The Defendants have moved this Court to strike the 
affidavit of the Plaintiff. Where the motions are denied, 
there is no need to rule on motion to strike. 
The Defendants have filed motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on several portions of the complaint. 
With respect to all claims against individual 
defendants, they relate entirely to legislative functions, 
even setting the budget, determining rates and expenses 
allocable to the operation of the electrical and sewer 
facilities in State, are legislative in nature and are 
protected by an unbrella of immunity. 
The first six claims of the plaintiff's complaint are 
Federal Civil Rights Claims. Remaining issues are brought 
under State law with respect to claim 1, of the plaintiffs 
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complaint, the same alleges that the City is involved in a 
Civil Rights violation against defendant by taking property 
without just compensation, violative of the fifth amendment of 
the United States Consititution. This Court specifically 
finds that that allegation does not state a Federal Civil 
Rights claim. In the denial of the Plaintiff's Summary 
Judgment, this Court pointed out that the Plaintiff has not 
shown that the rates charged are unreasonable, as 
reasonableness must be determined on more factors than just an 
expense/rate basis. It further assumed that the action is 
being brought under the Civil Rights Acts, section 1983 of the 
Civil Rights Act. But even if the allegation were true, that 
does not constitute a valid claim under that act. Rather the 
nature of alleged protected property interest of which the 
Plaintiff is being deprived is not articulated, though the 
defendant argues that the Plaintiff's relationship to the City 
is contractual and therefore it does not fall within the ambit 
of Constitutional protection. The Court does not necessarily 
agree that that is dispositive of the question as the services 
are far more than a contractual relationship. The City is the 
only agencey able to provide such services. However if 
Plaintiff's complaint is based on the breach of the implied 
contract, through excessive charges, that constitute a 
Federal Claim. 
The Court fully agrees with the defendant however in 
that in this case, the Court or should restrain itself from 
interferring with the exercise with legislative functions of 
the City, unless the City is out-side of its authority, its 
actions capricious, arbitrary, and or in violation of 
Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights. 
With respect to claim two of the Plaintiff's complaint, 
the Plaintiff has failed to show how it is he is being 
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discriminated against and therefore being deprived of equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the United States and the 
Utah Constitution. Plaintiff here allege that the City has 
been involved in a violation of Plaintiff's procedural and 
substant^e^"in due process rights. In support of the same the 
plaintiff has not shown that he has been deprived of other 
remedys available. 
The claim under 1983 Civil Right Act cannot be 
substantiated by showing that the defendant has violated the 
State Statutes or State Constitutional law. The Plaintiff has 
argued that the Defendant has acted in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated above cited, but liability under the 1983 Civil 
Rights rests upon violations of the United States Constitution. 
Plaintifffs claim 4, relative to denial of equal 
protection, is unsupported by any claim of discrimination at 
against a class to which the Plaintiff belongs. In fact no 
class to which he belongs is identified. Whether the law 
requires a showing of a purposeful discrimination or a 
specific intent on the behalf of the defendant, at this point 
is irrevelant. The Plaintiff has failed to show a denial, of 
equal protection. 
Under claim five and six of the Plaintifffs complaint, 
the Court fails to see where the Plaintiff has pled a 
violation of a constitutional law, or an application of the 
Federal or Constitutional Standards. Further more it seems 
clear the claims made in one through six may be articulated 
and sought through other remedial processes i.e. adequate 
State remedies to redress a property damage claim may exist. 
It seem there can be no deprivation of due process of law 
since the due process has not been accessed. Another avenue 
aside from the seeking of a 1983 Civil Rights Claim have not 
been 
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exhausted but here the Plaintiff has failed to show a 
deprivation of a Federal Constitutional protected Civil Right. 
The reasons above stated the defendants motion for 
Summary Judgment with respect from claims one through six and 
all claims against individual defendants shall be dismissed 
and the Summary Judgment granted. 
Counsel for the Defendant is directed to prepare a 
formal order. 
Dated this ///&< day of August, 1988. 
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I hereby certify that on the 12th day of August, 1988, I 
mailed, postage oreoaid, a true and correct cony of the foregoing 
Memoranudm Decision to Robert R. Wallace , 175 South West Temple, 
#650, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 and Alan B. Asay, 5251 South Green 
Street, Murray, Utah 84123, attorneys for plaintiff and to Allan L 
Larson, 10 Exchange Place 11th Floor, P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84084, to Ann Swensen, 10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor, P.O. Box 
45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145, to Jody K. Burnett, 10 Exchange 
Place 11th Floor, P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145, to 
Stanley K. Stoll, 10 Exchange Place 11th Floor, P.O. Box 45000, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145, to Merrill G. Hansen,1245 Brickyard Road, 
#600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 and to James I. Watts, 1245 Brickyard 
Road, #600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 attornevs for the defendants. 
